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Key Sentence:  
Social investors are supplying increasing amounts of finance to enterprises combining social and 
commercial objectives although these social enterprises are still more likely to seek bank finance, 
suggesting that social investors should focus on market gaps which are more likely to occur for 
smaller, younger social enterprises that lack track record and collateral. 
 
Key Findings: 
Social enterprises offer innovative ways of combining social and commercial objectives and are 
only slightly less likely to seek repayable finance than other SMEs, with younger social 
enterprises being more growth oriented and also more discouraged from borrowing. Where social 
enterprise borrowing takes place it is almost three times more likely to be from commercial 
banks, rather than specialist social investment lenders that are more likely to invest without 
requiring collateral. Social investment lenders should therefore focus their offer on finance gaps 
left by banks, notably in earlier stage social enterprise development, rather than compete for 
existing commercial bank market share.    
 




Social enterprises, operating at the interface of the non-profit sector and the commercial world, 
face particular challenges in accessing repayable finance as they are less likely to have the collateral 
of individual entrepreneurs and can appear less attractive to lenders and investors as they have to 
balance their social mission with commercial objectives (Doherty et al, 2014; Vickers et al, 2017a).  
This has been used as a justification for a wide range of social investment loan finance for these 
innovative ‘hybrid’, social enterprises that are wanting to scale up but may lack the security 
required by conventional lenders or (Nicholls, 2010; Castellas et al, 2018). However, little is known 
about the actual demand for repayable finance by these social enterprises, and how social 
investment can fill a finance gap left by conventional lenders.  
 
The supply of specific investment for social enterprise is expanding with specialist social 
investment programmes around the world (Vickers et al, 2017b; Rizzi, 2018). These funds are 
financed by investors that seek opportunities to lend to organizations that create social value at the 
same time as generating a financial return (Nicholls 2010) and range from financing programmes 
that offer subsidised loans for organisations with social values to forms of philanthropic venture 
capital.  
 
Much existing analysis of the social investment sector has focused on the nature of the supply with 
less attention to which types of organisations want and can afford debt finance. This paper therefore 
poses three research questions: which social enterprises are using repayable finance? What are the 




These questions are examined by taking the case of innovative hybrid organisations in the UK. In 
the UK there are a range of different social investors with added support from the wholesale 
provider of finance, Big Society Capital. The UK government has promoted itself as the 
international leader in this field particularly following its chairing of the G8 in 2014 (Big Society 
Capital, 2014). Analysis commissioned by Big Society Capital suggested a growing demand, 
centred on expectations of a growing role of social enterprises in public service delivery, changes 
in commissioning and the ability of social enterprises to develop sustainable business models 
(BCG, 2013).  
 
Existing analysis of demand for investment does not distinguish between demand from mainstream 
lenders (i.e. Mainstream ‘High Street’ banks) and demand from social investment finance 
intermediaries. There are further unanswered questions on the roles of commercial banks and social 
investors with regard to lending to social enterprise without collateral.  
 
This paper contributes to two fundamental theoretical issues related to the nature of hybrid 
organisational forms and the nature of finance that combines social and environmental aims with 
commercial objectives. First, it examines how these organisations delivering social and 
environmental services use loan finance of different kinds. It contributes to SME finance theory by 
examining how social enterprises differ from other SMEs in terms of their preference for different 
types of finance (i.e. their pecking order). Second, the forms of social investment described above 
are explored and are shown to be in themselves hybrid forms that combine both financial returns 
with social and philanthropic aims. However, we raise important policy questions over the 
additionality of such philanthropic investment as it can displace or crowd out mainstream bank 
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finance rather than having additional social impacts. Implications for the evaluation of social 
investment are also explored. 
 
This paper takes the social enterprise as the unit of analysis and focuses on the use of repayable 
loan finance that might come from specialist social investors or from conventional sources such as 
banks. This is distinguished from other forms of finance (sometimes also referred to as social 
investment) such as retained profit/surplus, grants and investment from owners/staff. Grant finance 
is not included in the analysis, although it is recognised that for many social investors, loans can 
be combined with grants. The paper starts by reviewing the literature on social enterprise finance.  
It then sets out the methodology based on using the SEUK survey (2013) which is the largest and 
most robust available survey of UK social enterprise use of external investment. The findings 
section presents the analysis of how different types of social enterprise use loan finance and the 
particular role of social investment in lending to those social enterprises that may have less access 
to finance from conventional sources. The discussion and conclusion contribute to debates on the 
nature of finance for the social economy, and policy interventions to create and grow a form of 




Social enterprise and use of repayable finance 
Social enterprises are defined by their combination of social mission and commercial orientation 
(Austin et al, 2006; Mair and Marti, 2006; Doherty et al, 2014). As such, they are an organisational 
form characterised by hybridity (Billis, 2010) that challenges traditional concepts of economic 
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organising (Wilson and Post, 2013). A key challenge facing social enterprises is the management 
of the competing institutional logics of social value and commerce (Pache and Santos, 2012) and 
the need to bridge these institutional fields (Tracey et al, 2011) particularly when innovating 
(Vickers et al, 2017a).   
 
Defining social enterprise is particularly challenging as organisations can be located on a 
continuum between the purely philanthropic and the purely commercial (Dees, 1998). Some are 
firmly paced within the charitable sector with legal forms that involve asset locks and restrictions 
on distributions. There are social enterprises, such as B Corps, that can have private sector legal 
forms. In all countries there are a range of legal forms of governance that social enterprises can 
draw on for a range of governance models (Smith and Teasdale, 2012; Lyon and Faruq, 2018).  
 
With the emphasis on both social and financial objectives, social enterprises differ from other social 
ventures with respect to their use of finance (Austin et al, 2006). This change is particularly evident 
as organisations distance themselves from purely philanthropic sources of income, and seek out 
trading income (Dees, 1999). The management of social enterprises becomes further distanced 
from a philanthropic model when repayable or loan finance is sought. In such cases a commercial 
venture is required in order to generate a cash flow and surplus to repay the loan (Lumpkin et al, 
2013). However, research by Sunley and Pinch (2012) found that social enterprises with asset 
locks1 restricting individual benefit continued to rely on public sector grants and were cautious 
about taking on debt. There is therefore a lack of clarity about the current use of repayable finance 
and the current demand.  
                                                 
1 Statutory asset locks exist for Charities (regulator: Charities Commission), Community Interest 




The current demand for finance from social enterprises, requires attention to the extent of 
discouraged borrowers. This has been a focus of much research for SMEs more generally.  
Widespread evidence suggests that access to finance for all types of enterprise (including social 
enterprise) became considerably more difficult and expensive in the UK after the global financial 
crisis (GFC) and was constraining potential business growth. The aftermath of the GFC resulted in 
an increasing incidence of discouraged borrowers (Fraser, 20092) as opposed to ‘happy non 
seekers’ (Fraser, 2014). Although there have been signs of improved bank lending in the UK 
subsequently (Bank of England, 2015), the discouraged borrowers and those not able to get the 
finance they require contribute to what some term the funding gap3. It is worth noting that Kon and 
Storey (2003) and more latterly Owen et al (2016) urge caution as to the level of validity (how 
great the need, as opposed to wishful thinking) and viability (does the business have a sufficiently 
robust case and track record to merit funding) of discouraged borrowers – suggesting that whilst it 
contributes to the finance gap, it requires careful contextualisation.  
 
The supply of finance is a particular problem for those enterprises that lack collateral and a track 
record. Primarily, there are problems of accessing early stage business finance in matching the 
changing financing needs and options of small firms as they become ‘less informationally opaque’ 
                                                 
2 A detailed discussion of discouraged borrower theory is presented in Kon and Storey (2003) 
3 UK funding gaps have been referred to regularly since Macmillan (1931), with Breedon’s 
(2012) report on UK SME financing options estimating a finance gap of in excess of £84bn over 
the next five years. During recessionary times the supply of finance to SMEs is further 
constrained by banks’ ‘cyclical’ credit rationing, resulting in more expensive, more stringent 
terms of lending (Cowling et al., 2012). This means that even for more established SMEs, the 
availability of working capital overdraft, short term loan and asset finance has been limited, 
severely hampering further business development. The availability of less expensive longer term 
‘patient’ loan finance for business growth projects amongst more established SMEs has also 
been severely curtailed (GLA, 2013). 
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to potential finance providers (Berger and Udell, 1998). A central tenet is that the inter-
connectedness and substitutability between different sources of finance is crucial to financing the 
continuous development of businesses. Obtaining finance is more difficult for early stage 
businesses and those that do not meet existing norms of business – such as highly disruptive market 
innovators (North et al. 2013) or SEs with legal forms of ownership and income streams, that are 
atypical of mainstream businesses.  These may lack track record and collateral and face 
informational asymmetries. Information asymmetries occur where financiers do not possess 
sufficient knowledge and understanding of the business proposition and are unable to assess its 
viability without undertaking considerable due diligence. Undertaking the required level of due 
diligence check may be prohibitively expensive to undertake to justify funding and leads to a 
market failure gap – a form of agency failure (Akerlof, 1970 & 1976) - where viable propositions 
are not funded (North et al. 2010). Where funding takes place without sufficient due diligence, two 
associated forms of agency failure can take place which relate to moral hazard where business 
managers do not perform as well as expected, and adverse selection where unsuitable poor 
performing businesses are funded (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Hsu, 2004; Hughes, 2009). In 
the past, banks sought to overcome information asymmetries through relationship banking (Berger 
and Udell, 1995 & 2006) where appointed specialist SME bank finance officers/managers develop 
direct relationships with their clients to better understand their business operations, income and 
financing patterns and external financing needs. Whilst this can work effectively with existing 
clients and where there is low staff turnover, it has proved expensive to operate and less effective 
for younger businesses (North et al, 2010). Therefore, despite some findings that banks operating 
relationship lending practices perform better during economic downturns (Bolton et al. 2013; Beck 
et al. 2014) in the UK, notably since the GFC, banks have moved out of early stage business lending 
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and away from relationship banking (Cowling et al 2012; GLA, 2013; North et al 2013). Moreover, 
the use of standard credit scoring techniques by banks tends to favour established trading 
businesses with collateral rather than higher risk intangible asset based enterprises (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981; Bank of England 1996 and 2001; Cressy 2002; Fraser, 2014).  
 
Additionally, it should be noted that poor access to repayable finance is not only caused by the 
suppliers of finance as applicants must also present investible propositions. Mason and Kwok 
(2010) and Mason and Harrison (2001) find that SME owners-managers often have little finance 
application experience, with various studies (e.g. North et al 2013; Owen et al, 2016) demonstrating 
that experienced entrepreneurs have greater success. Age and size of enterprises can therefore 
shape access to finance. The issue of the maturity and experience of enterprises leads us to our first 
hypothesis 
H1. Social enterprises’ use of repayable finance is likely to increase with the size, age and 
growth ambitions of the social enterprise. 
 
 
Sources of repayable finance for social enterprises and the use of social investment 
 
Social enterprises can have a number of sources of repayable finance although there has been no 
research on the preferences for different types. The use of pecking order theory from mainstream 
SME finance theory can provide insights into the business demand-side preferences for different 
sources of finance.  Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) recognise an entrepreneurial 
pecking order preference for internal over external finance and then debt finance over ceding 
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equity. A key to business pecking order preferences is the optimisation of retained ownership and 
effective cost and availability of external finance where required. Therefore, as subsequent studies 
have found, whilst the basic premise of the theory holds, the availability of different forms of 
external finance along the finance escalator, combined with past experience and external linkages 
to particular financiers can have strong influence. Atherton (2009), Baldock (2013), Baldock et al 
(2015) find that pecking orders may be adjusted by entrepreneurial experiential conditioning, with 
experienced entrepreneurs’ past experience creating path dependency preferences (Teece, 2007) 
for the types of finance they have used before. Furthermore, the availability of certain types of 
finance may lead to readjustments. For example, the availability of grant finance which is deemed 
preferable to debt or equity, may require matching private funds which in practice can only be met 
by equity, rather than debt finance. This, along with for example serial entrepreneur preferences 
for equity finance, has led to the inversion of pecking order theory with preferences for equity over 
debt finance for young innovative businesses described by North et al (2013) and Baldock et al 
(2015). For social enterprises that may have become path dependant on grant funding which is no 
longer available it may be theorised that they will seek debt finance and more likely specialist 
finance if it is lower cost, or more readily available than other forms of mainstream finance.  
The conventional SME finance theories support the use of a financing lifecycle stages model 
(Burger and Udell, 19984) and there are assumptions that this should be equally applicable to social 
enterprises (Birkett, 2010). While social enterprises can seek support from banks and venture 
capitalists (Bryson and Buttle, 2005), they differ from other enterprises as they are able to combine 
commercial finance with philanthropic sources, and may be able to draw on their relationships with 
other stakeholders to source grant finance instead of having to seek repayable finance (Chertok et 
                                                 
4 Adapted for example in the finance escalator model by North, et al. (2013) and Harrison (2013) 
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al, 2008; Dees, 1998). This suggests that new and young enterprises will have pecking order 
preference of self-funding and grant funding, followed by subsidised debt followed by market rate 
debt funding and finally equity. As they become more established and mature, typically with a 
minimum two year trading track record, they will become more attractive to mainstream bank 
lenders. However, there is an assumption that investors and banks will prefer commercial 
companies over social enterprises as they may be better at generating cashflow and surpluses 
(Lumpkin et al, 2013).  
 
To meet this perceived finance gap for social enterprises, there has been a rapidly growing ‘social 
investment’ infrastructure emerging across the world. While banks and conventional sources are 
important (Bryson and Buttle, 2005), finance with social value orientations combining both 
financial and social returns have been given increasing attention by policy makers (Social Business 
Initiative, 2014) and researchers (Nicholls, 2010; Jeggers and Nicholls, 2016). This latter form of 
‘social investment’ provides finance at preferable rates and combines loans with elements of 
philanthropy (Scarlatta and Alemany, 2010; Lumpkin et al, 2013), or longer term patient capital 
(Van Sandt et al, 2009).  
 
Questions remain over the types of social enterprise that are using social investment. The 
justification for having philanthropic or public sector funds used for social investment is based on 
the perceived market failure of mainstream commercial repayable finance and the inability of 
particular social enterprises to seek repayable finance from elsewhere. As discussed earlier, 
younger enterprises with a lack of collateral may find accessing finance harder and therefore be 




This leads to the second and third hypotheses: 
H2. Social enterprises have a preference for social investment sources of finance over 
other forms of repayable finance?  
H3. Social investment is more likely to be provided to social enterprises that cannot seek 




Social enterprise and social investment in the UK 
The role of social enterprises has been evolving in the UK during the past two decades. The UK 
Government has a policy to support the transition of many charities and community service 
providers into social enterprises, aiming to reduce their grant dependency by establishing new 
financing instruments to fund their development with the goal that they become a more efficient 
and effective provider of public services, notably in deprived neighbourhoods (Cabinet Office, 
2011). At the time, policies of austerity have led to cuts in public sector programmes to build the 
capacity of social enterprise.  
 
There is a growing interest in lending for a social purpose amongst philanthropic funds, the 
government and growth oriented social enterprises in the UK. There are various sources of ‘social 
investment’ with Big Society Capital acting as a wholesale bank for social investors developing 
innovative sources of finance. While the social investment policy agenda continues previous 
governments’ policies, the actual outcomes can be seen in various diverse wider policy objectives, 
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including some radically new ones. The capital funding can also be used to finance the more radical 
areas of policies such as the involvement of social enterprise in driving competition in health 
services, free schools and academies, and the delivery of Payment by Results contracts (where 
social enterprises may be paid months after delivery of the service based on getting people back to 
work or reducing reoffending).  
 
These policies and investment funds have been operating in an uncertain environment. Firstly, 
there is lack of evidence of demand for loan finance from social enterprises. Secondly, there is lack 
of knowledge about the existing supply of mainstream finance that might be operating in 




This paper draws on an analysis of the Social Enterprise UK survey of 878 social enterprises 
(SEUK, 2013). This provides the most robust and comprehensive data set on UK social enterprise. 
The sample frame of 9,024 organisations was built from members of social enterprise umbrella 
bodies representing UK regions and social enterprise sectors. The survey questionnaire confirmed 
if organisations conformed to the standard UK government definition of social enterprise with at 
least 26 per cent of annual income from trade as opposed to grants and donations and with 
respondents defining themselves as social enterprises complying with the following statement:  
 
“Social enterprises are defined as “businesses with primarily social objectives whose 
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or community, rather 
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than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners. The social 
enterprise movement is inclusive and extremely diverse, encompassing organisations such 
as development trusts, community enterprises, co-operatives, housing associations, 'social 
firms' and leisure trusts, among others.  Would you say that does describe what your 
organisation does?” 
 
This results in a large sample of organisations self-defining as social enterprises and having links 
to regional support infrastructure bodies, but may exclude some organisations that are not linked 
into these support networks. The majority of organisations (51 per cent) were Companies Limited 
by Guarantee (CLG), usually with ‘Charity’ status, with a further 19 per cent being cooperatives 
with an Industrial and Provident Societies form (IPS), 17- per cent being Community Interest 
Companies (a new legal form with asset locks to restrict private distributions) and 12 per cent being 
Companies Limited by Share (but with a core social purpose, similar to B-Corps). Forms of social 
enterprise such as cooperatives, social firms or development trusts can take on any of these legal 
forms. There is no population survey of social enterprise but comparisons of the sample frame to 
other large samples shows that this survey is broadly representative. A comparison with the 
National Survey of Third Sector Organisations5 shows no statistically significant differences 
relating to sectoral balance, legal ownership status and the size of organisations, once the private 
sector entities have been taken out of the State of Social Enterprise sample6. 
 
                                                 
5 Renamed National Survey of Charities and Social Enterprises 




Senior managers or owners of social enterprises were telephone interviewed in February 2013 on 
whether they had applied for new sources of external finance during 2012. Further to undertaking 
descriptive analysis of the of the SEUK, binary logistic modelling is used to establish: (i) firstly, 
the likelihood for seeking debt finance in the last 12 months; (ii) secondly, the likelihood for 
success in receiving some debt finance; (iii) thirdly, the likelihood of receiving all debt finance 
required. The dependent variables (sought, received some, and received all) were tested against a 
series of independent variables relating to social enterprise characteristics, including: establishment 
age; size by annual income; legal status; main trading customer market; future growth aim 
orientation. In further analysis, consideration is given to the type of debt finance sought and the 
type of lender approached. 
 
Using a sifting process, it was quickly possible to identify many of the business characteristics as 
insignificant and those presented in the model were those which appeared to have greatest 
significance in the likelihood of social enterprises seeking and receiving formal external debt 




Social enterprises’ use of repayable finance. 
Our first research question explored the types of social enterprises that were seeking and 
receiving repayable finance. The analysis showed that almost half (47.6 per cent) of the surveyed 
social enterprises sought external finance in 2012. However, a large proportion of this is in the 
form of grant finance. Our focus in this paper is on repayable debt finance which was sought by 
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14.8 per cent of social enterprises, relating mainly to loans (9.8 per cent) and overdrafts (6.2 per 
cent)7. 
 
Our analysis focused on the types of seekers of debt finance presented in Table 1. Univariate 
analysis demonstrates that demand for debt finance is significantly (<.001 level) greater amongst 
the largest social enterprises with annual income of over £1m (28.1 per cent), with least demand 
amongst the smallest social enterprises with less than £100,000 annual income (9.8 per cent). While 
there is a diverse range of legal forms, there are no significant differences in the results of 
regression modelling (Appendix).  
 
( insert Table 1: Types of Social Enterprise Debt Finance Seekers) 
 
There is also greater likelihood of seeking debt finance from those expecting growth, although 11 
per cent of social enterprises forecasting declining sales turnover were seeking finance, suggesting 
that they are investing in changes in order to re-establish themselves, or are taking on debt to 
survive.  
 
There is a significantly (<.01 level) high proportion of social enterprises aged between 6-10 years 
seeking debt finance. Examining all social enterprises (n=878) growth aim is significantly (<.05 
level) associated with younger traders, declining in each ascending age category (from 85 per cent 
trading under two years to 48 per cent trading over 20 years). The 6-10 year category (55 per cent 
                                                 
7 Note that multiple types of finance could be sought by surveyed SEs during the 2012 year. 
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seeking future growth) is therefore less likely to be growth oriented than the younger age 
categories.  
   
It is also evident that social enterprises whose main trade is with the public sector have a 
significantly (<.05 level) higher proportion seeking debt finance (19.7 per cent), followed by those 
mainly trading with the private sector (15.5 per cent). Sectoral analysis demonstrates that social 
services and childcare (22.9 per cent), culture and leisure (22 per cent) and employment and 
training (21 per cent) were all significantly (<.05 level) more likely to seek debt finance than social 
enterprises surveyed in the other sectors categorised. However, it should be noted that most social 
enterprises delivered services across a number of sectors. 
 
When examining the success rates for secured and unsecured loans, there appears to be little 
difference, with just over two thirds of secured and unsecured loans providing all finance required 
whilst 75.9 per cent of those with security and 73.3 per cent of those without security receiving at 
least some of the funding requested. Larger social enterprises, with annual income of over £1m, 
were significantly more likely (at <.05 level) to receive at least some of the finance required (84.2 
per cent). Indeed, only three in five (61.3  per cent) applicants in smaller firms with under £100,000 
annual income received all of the funding that they required compared with more than four out of 
five (81.6  per cent) of those with annual income of over £1m. Success rates varied according to 
the type of debt finance sought, with leasing finance (89.3  per cent) and mortgage finance (80  per 
cent) both significantly (<.05 level) more successful in gaining all finance required, followed by 
overdraft finance (66.7  per cent) and term loan finance (65.1  per cent). A significantly (<.05 level) 
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higher proportion of those seeking overdraft (79.5 per cent) than loan (69.8 per cent) finance 
received at least some funding.  
 
Larger debt finance seekers with over £1m annual income were more likely to be trading with the 
public sector than their smaller counterparts (71.1 per cent compared to 61.4 per cent) and 
significantly less likely to be trading with the private sector (<.01 level; 42.1 per cent to 68.7 per 
cent) and other social enterprises (<.05 level; 39.5 per cent to 59 per cent). It is also evident that a 
higher proportion of businesses trading mainly with the public sector were able to receive all (74.4 
per cent) or at least some (79.5 per cent) of their required formal debt finance. This suggests that 
public sector clients may be perceived by debt financers as more reliable sources of income (despite 
recent public sector cutbacks), or those with weaker business cases are more likely to be dissuaded 
in applying in the first place.  
 
Whilst enterprise age was not a significant factor in success rates, it is evident that the older 
established enterprises, trading more than six years, with longer financial track records were more 
successful in receiving either all or at least some of their required debt finance. It is notable that 
those enterprises trading between 3-5 years were least successful in obtaining finance, with more 
than one third of these debt finance seekers (35.3 per cent) receiving no formal debt finance.  
 
The only sector exhibiting a slightly significant trend is the lower proportion of employment and 
training enterprises receiving at least some finance (56 per cent; significant at <.1 level), with a 
low proportion of smaller enterprises experiencing any success (47 per cent of applicants with 
under £1m income). The creative enterprise sector also exhibited proportionally lower success 
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rates, supporting Fraser’s (2014) findings that enterprises in this sector may suffer from more acute 
information asymmetry issues. 
 
One in five social enterprises (21 per cent) may be termed ‘latent borrowers’ that had not sought 
external debt finance during the previous 12 months, but indicated that they may have sought 
finance if circumstances had been different. Within this group,’discouraged borrowers’, who were 
deterred by external financing circumstances, rather than wider economic, conditions, were 
significantly more likely (<.01 level) to be smaller social enterprises with less than £100,000 annual 
income, and also more likely to be younger enterprises trading for five years or less (11.2   per 
cent). The proportion of latent borrowers is considerably higher than the 11.3 per cent recorded in 
the UK employer SMEs survey during the previous 12 months in the SBS 2012 (BIS, 2013). The 
majority were likely to be waiting for a suitable economic up-turn before commencing with new 
investment (effectively forming part of Fraser’s 2014 ‘contented non borrowers’). However, there 
was evidence of Fraser’s (2009) ‘discouraged borrowers’ demonstrated by the 8.8  per cent 
(compared to 6  per cent of employer SMEs in the SBS 2012) that perceived that the cost of finance 
was too high or the terms were too stringent (2.8  per cent, with 1.4 per cent lacking sufficient 
security, and 0.3 per cent discouraged by previous rejection), that they did not know where to find 
appropriate finance (2.5  per cent, with 1.4 per cent lacking confidence to apply, 1.5 per cent 
expecting rejection from known sources, and 0.8 per cent stating no suitable sources available), or 
would take too long to find appropriate finance (0.8  per cent). It is also likely that some of these 
organisations do not have viable business propositions that are needed to pay back loans. The 
suggestion is that these are the social enterprises that require investment readiness assessment and 




The sources of investment used 
The second research question explored the sources of investment. Mainstream banks are the most 
frequently applied for source of debt finance by 64 per cent of debt finance seeking social 
enterprises. One in four of social enterprises seeking debt finance approached social investors.  
 
(insert Table 2: Main sources of debt finance applied for) 
  
The average size of lending differs according to the type of the provider. Even after applying a 
trimmed mean, social investors were approached for loans that were on average slightly smaller 
than for banks. However, the lower median for bank lending suggests that a lot of bank loans to 
social enterprises were considerably smaller.  
 
(insert Table 3: Amount of Debt Finance Sought by size of social enterprise and provider type) 
 
The third research question examines the types of social enterprise using specialist social 
investment. Social investment is aimed to provide finance where other providers are unable or 
unwilling to invest. It is therefore expected to be found in early stage enterprises and those without 
collateral. When analysing the age of enterprises and their sources of finance, we found that for the 
social enterprises under 20 years old and seeking finance, 25 per cent were going to social investors. 
However, for the finance seekers over 20 years old, only 14 per cent were going to social investors. 
It is notable that social enterprise borrower preferences for bank finance increase with trading age 




Social enterprises were more likely (but not significantly) to obtain all of the funding that they 
required from a social lender (75 per cent), or source other than mainstream banks (65.1 per cent). 
However, the highest proportion of social enterprises failing to obtain any finance came from social 
lenders (25 per cent). Social enterprises appear more successful in obtaining mainstream bank 
finance from first source providers when we compare with employer SMEs in the SBS, 2012, 
where only 63 per cent successfully received at least some finance (56 per cent receiving all) from 
their first source mainstream bank.        
 
(insert Table 4: Type of Lender by Social Enterprise Success Rates in Obtaining Debt Finance)  
 
Discussion 
The first research question explored the types of social enterprises using repayable finance. The 
hypothesis 1 stated: 
 H1. Social enterprises’ use of repayable finance is likely to increase with the size, age and 
growth ambitions of the social enterprise.  
The analysis shows that a sizable proportion (14.8 per cent) are seeking repayable finance with 
63.1 per cent getting all and 6.1 per cent receiving part of what they requested. During the same 
time period, 14.6 per cent of SMEs were seeking finance with 58.3 per cent successful in receiving 
all and 3.5% receiving some (BIS, 2013). The assumption that social enterprises are unlikely to 
receive finance due to their combination of social and commercial objectives not fitting the norms 
of investors, is therefore challenged. We also examined how access to finance is related to age and 
size. With regard to the hypothesis, we assumed that as organisations become more established and 
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have collateral or secured assets against which they can borrow, their use of repayable fiancé will 
increase. The findings show that we can accept this hypothesis. Seekers are more likely to be larger 
organisations, those with above £1m sales turnover being almost three times more likely to seek 
repayable finance and larger social enterprises are more likely to be successful in receiving finance. 
This supports findings on SME finance which shows the lack of track record leading to information 
asymmetries between investors and younger enterprises (SBS, 2012; ERC - Owen et al., 2015). As 
expected, those predicting growth are more likely to seek finance but 11 per cent of social 
enterprises forecasting decreasing income also sought repayable finance.  
 
Although less significant, the higher proportion of growth oriented social enterprises seeking 
finance (16.4 per cent) corresponds with findings for UK SMEs (SBS, 2012; RT&P, 2010). In 
terms of age, those in the 6 to 10 year age group were more likely to seek finance. This differs from 
other SMEs where there is greater likelihood of seeking finance in the first five years (BIS, 2013). 
This study shows that younger social enterprises are more likely to have growth ambitions. It 
suggests a potential tipping point at which social enterprises reach a development life cycle stage 
when they have sufficient trading record and confidence to apply for loan finance. Those younger 
organisations rely on grants and retained earnings to grow. 
 
Furthermore, those with the public sector providing their main income were more likely to seek 
finance, as there is growth in opportunities for social enterprise in these sectors. However, this 





The findings also provide evidence of the success rates. First, there are the 3.5 per cent of social 
enterprises (24 per cent of those seeking) that have tried but failed to get repayable finance from 
banks, social investors and other sources. On the basis of these initial success rates, social 
enterprises appear marginally more successful than their SME employer counterparts with surveys 
reporting that 32 per cent of SMEs were not able to get the repayable finance they sought.  
 
Previous literature has suggested that social enterprises may be less likely to be successful in 
obtaining debt finance from mainstream lenders than SMEs because they will face additional and 
specific moral hazards (Westall, 2001), agency failures and organisational issues (Sunley and 
Pinch, 2012) and information asymmetries. However, in this study, the social enterprises 
surveyed appear to be more successful.  The reasons behind this are not clear but could be 
attributed to higher quality propositions, the role of the social investment finance intermediaries, 
or more marginal applications being deterred.  
 
The second research question was concerned with the sources of finance. Much literature on the 
subject has been exploring the supply of innovative approaches of ‘social investment’ which 
provide repayable finance while also aiming to having social outcomes. Hypothesis 2 stated:  
H2. Social enterprises have a preference for social investment sources of finance over 
other forms of repayable finance  
The findings show that this hypothesis is rejected with more social enterprises seeking finance 
from banks despite social investors claiming that there was a shortage of deals and investable 
propositions available to them at the time of the survey. Social investment is found to play a small 
but important role with 3.6 per cent of social enterprises using these sources. This suggests that a 
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‘pecking order theory’ for social enterprise needs to be reappraised as banks and social investors 
appear to be at similar positions in the order. The concerns over lack of bank investment in place 
could also be due to the investors’ concerns over the lack of track record and business experience, 
rather than claims that banks are concerned about ownership. The large amount of bank lending to 
non-trading charities also shows that banks may be willing to lend to organisations with different 
forms of ownership if they are convinced about their ability to repay. Indeed, the risk averse nature 
of non-profit and social enterprise leaders and trustees, may be making these forms of organisations 
more attractive than conventional SMEs.    
 
The third research question sought to identify the types of social enterprises using social 
investment.  Hypothesis 3 stated:  
H3. Social investment is more likely to be provided to social enterprises that cannot seek 
finance from elsewhere due to lack of collateral.   
Previous literature has assumed that social investment exists to fill a market failure found in 
mainstream bank finance particularly for those enterprises that have no assets to secure finance and 
do not have a track record with banks because of their young age, or information asymmetries 
where SE legal form of ownership is less easily understood or accepted by mainstream lenders. 
Our findings suggest that the latter point can largely be rejected and that mainstream banks have 
adapted to lending to SE legal forms. The research shows that the social investors do offer more 
unsecured loans to 60 per cent of applicants with banks offering unsecured loans to 42 per cent of 
their social enterprise applicants. However, the analysis shows an insignificant different in success 
rates for those having secured or unsecured lending. This revealed an insignificant difference with 
27 per cent of unsecured applications being rejected compared to 24 per cent of secured loans being 
24 
 
rejected. It appears more likely that rejection is due to the organisation having a poor business 
proposition, in which case they should not be applying for repayable finance in the first place and 
be advised to seek other ways of meeting their social purpose. These organisations may also be a 
focus for business support to build their capacity to develop a sustainable business. Overall, whilst 
there is no significant difference in SE finance applicant success rates by age, it is clear that 
specialist SE finance is more likely to be sought by younger SEs and it is those under 6 years 





There is much interest in the forms of finance that are able to help social enterprises scale up their 
social impact. This study has shown that a sizable proportion of social enterprises (15 per cent) are 
seeking repayable finance, despite the view that these types of organisations are averse to 
borrowing. This proportion of borrowers is only slightly lower than rates found among SME 
populations. The study has also found that those borrowing tend to be the older and larger 
organisations that have the track record of successful business and therefore the information to 
demonstrate their ability to repay the finance. This is in line with SME finance theory.  
 
The attention given social investors in the social enterprise literature and in other media, might lead 
people to assume that these funds are the most important sources of finance. This study has shown 
that mainstream banks are much more important, despite the fact that many social investment funds 
are struggling to find investable propositions. It is therefore suggested that the social investors are 
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not offering attractive propositions or timely responses, or targeting sufficiently where demand is 
most required for younger SEs. This suggests a potential role for policymakers in enhancing the 
supply of specialist or mainstream finance – alongside appropriate investor readiness support. 
 
 
This also raises questions about the role of public policy and philanthropic funds in shaping the 
supply of social investment. Policy change, along with substantial policy rhetoric relating to the 
roles of social enterprise and now social investment, has encouraged a shift amongst charities and 
other ‘not for profit forms’ from a reliance on grants and donations to trading income and now loan 
finance. These policies can also be seen as displaying hybridity with multiple objectives beyond 
supporting the financial growth of firms to wider social and economic objectives. However, the 
theories of public sector intervention for these hybrid forms have failed to adequately explore the 
concept of displacement. 
 
This study has limitations from the size of the sample, despite being one the biggest social 
enterprise surveys in the UK. We also acknowledge the cross-sectional nature of the study and 
the need for longitudinal research. Nonetheless, this represents a first valid step towards 
understanding the UK experience. Future follow-up research is needed on a large sample of 
social enterprises that have sought social investment finance, and on the discouraged borrowers 
who have not sought finance but are interested in applying for finance that meets their social 
goals. Evaluations of social investment need to pay more attention to additionality and there is a 




Appendix:  Binary logit regression models 
 
Model 1: Social enterprise likelihood of seeking debt finance in the previous 12 months 
(n=878) 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Age 6-10 yrs .631 .232 7.383 1 .007 1.879 
Public trade .213 .256 .691 1 .406 1.238 
TS/SE trade .498 .316 2.477 1 .115 1.645 
Sales <£100k -.583 .256 5.169 1 .023 .558 
Sales £1m+ .785 .261 9.088 1 .003 2.193 
Grow aim .461 .248 3.444 1 .063 1.585 
Decline likely -.492 .448 1.204 1 .273 .611 
CLG .250 .225 1.238 1 .266 1.284 
CIC .207 .292 .501 1 .479 1.230 
Cult/leisure .478 .301 2.530 1 .112 1.613 
Emp/train .271 .285 .905 1 .341 1.311 
Socia/child .629 .284 4.902 1 .027 1.875 
Retail/hos/tran .602 .269 5.002 1 .025 1.826 
Creative .461 .379 1.475 1 .224 1.586 
Constant -2.733 .318 74.023 1 .000 .065 










1 615.109a .071 .122 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 
because parameter estimates changed by less 
than .001. 
 
The above findings which are extremely robust (R sq .122), indicate that the following business 
characteristics were all significantly (<.05 level) more likely to be associated with social enterprise 
debt finance seekers during the previous 12 months: most significantly the largest SEs with annual 
income of £1m or more (<.01 level), SEs aged between 6-10 years (<.01 level), with the social 
services and childcare and retail, hospitality and transport sectors all significant (<.05 level). 
Future growth aim was fairly significant (at <.1 level), whilst the smallest social enterprises with 
annual income of under £100k were significantly (<.05 level) less likely to seek finance. 
 
Neither Model 2 nor Model 3 relating to receipt of all or at least some of the debt finance applied 
for reveal any highly significant results and their considerably smaller sample sizes render them 
less robust. The strongest tendencies appear to be for larger social enterprises to be more successful, 
both in terms of receiving all or at least some debt funding. Also intriguingly, whilst employment 
and training was the least likely sector (within the multivariate analysis presented) to apply for debt 
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finance it was the sector most likely to receive at least some debt funding, the sector contains an 
above average proportion of larger social enterprises seeking finance and an above average 
proportion of these succeeding in obtaining finance, suggesting that whilst the larger enterprises 
presented strong cases, the overall poor performance in the sector presented by the univariate 
analysis was down to a high proportion of smaller enterprises failing to obtain debt finance. Again, 
whilst not significant, CLGs were less likely to receive some or all debt funding sought. 
Model 2: If at least some funding received (n=130) 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
Age 6-10 yrs -.174 .484 .129 1 .720 .841 
Public trade .566 .579 .957 1 .328 1.761 
TS/SE trade -.088 .626 .020 1 .888 .915 
Sales <£100k -.038 .596 .004 1 .949 .963 
Sales £1m+ .751 .582 1.661 1 .197 2.119 
Grow aim .302 .545 .308 1 .579 1.353 
Decline likely 1.178 1.358 .752 1 .386 3.248 
CLG -.732 .565 1.678 1 .195 .481 
CIC -.556 .657 .716 1 .397 .574 
Cult/leisure .487 .637 .584 1 .445 1.628 
Emp/train 1.613 1.148 1.976 1 .160 5.020 
Socia/child -.394 .613 .414 1 .520 .674 
Retail/hos/tran .515 .576 .801 1 .371 1.674 
Creative -.333 .737 .204 1 .651 .717 
Constant .852 .722 1.395 1 .238 2.345 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1 in order above 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 




1 127.235a .099 .144 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 







Model 3: If received all debt funding (n=130) 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
Age 6-10 yrs .149 .468 .101 1 .750 1.161 
Public trade .336 .538 .390 1 .532 1.399 
TS/SE trade -.380 .606 .394 1 .530 .684 
Sales <£100k .024 .567 .002 1 .966 1.025 
Sales £1m+ .884 .554 2.544 1 .111 2.420 
Grow aim .607 .513 1.398 1 .237 1.834 
Decline likely 1.703 1.347 1.597 1 .206 5.489 
CLG -.604 .525 1.322 1 .250 .547 
CIC -.381 .623 .373 1 .541 .684 
Cult/leisure .806 .643 1.575 1 .209 2.240 
Emp/train .967 .895 1.167 1 .280 2.631 
Socia/child .061 .598 .011 1 .918 1.063 
Retail/hos/tran .354 .536 .437 1 .509 1.425 
Creative -.559 .719 .605 1 .437 .572 
Constant .109 .674 .026 1 .872 1.115 




Step -2 Log 
likelihood 




1 137.022a .117 .164 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 
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Tables for main body text (as indicated) 
 
 
Table 1: Types of Social Enterprise Debt Finance Seekers 
 
Per cent of seekers in row 
category Number of Seekers Per cent of All SEs 
Annual business income: most recent recorded year end 
<£100k 9.8*** 31 3.5 
£100k to £1m 15.9 52 5.9 
£1m+ 28.1*** 38 4.3 
Growth orientation: forecast income change during the next 2-3 years 
Increase 16.4 90 10.3 
Same 13.3 28 3.2 
Decrease 11.4 9 1 
Trading age 
Up to 2 years 14 27 3.1 
3-5 years 12.5 17 1.9 
6-10 years 22.3** 40 4.6 
11-20 years 15.9 25 2.8 
21+ years 10.1 21 2.4 




Table 2: Main sources of debt finance applied for 
 
Per cent of each 




Per cent of 
All SEs 
Bank 63.8 83 9.5 
All Social Funders (SB, SI, CDFI) 24.6 32 3.6 
Other (not social investors) 34.6 45 5.1 
Note: Seven out of eight (87.7 per cent) debt finance seekers sought more than one type of finance (n=130 debt finance 
seekers). Social funders include specialist intermediaries with a social mission: social investors, social banks and 
community development finance institutions.  ‘Other’ comprises building societies, credit unions, government/local 
authority loans, peer to peer lenders and informal friends and family lenders. 
 
Table 3: Amount of Debt Finance Sought by size of social enterprise and provider type 
Provider N= Min (£) Max (£) Med (£) Mean (£) 
Trimmed 
mean 
Bank 74 2,000 30,000,000 80,000 1,352,064 505,164 
All Social investors 29 15,000 7,000,000 250,000 705,414 437,174 
Other (not social 
investors) 
38 6,000 5,500,000 100,000 620,547 386,140 
All debt seekers 107* 500 30,000,000 85,000 1,048,122 £380,643 
Note: Includes examples of multiple finance seeking from different sources; Trimmed mean excludes outlying highest 





Table 4: Type of Lender by Social Enterprise Success Rates in Obtaining Debt Finance  
 All At least Some None Seekers 
 
Row   
per cent Row   per cent 
Row   per 
cent N= 
All Social Funders (SB, SI, 
CDFI) 75 75 25 32 
Bank 65.1 73.5 16.5 83 
Other (no social funders) 73.3 77.8 22.2 45 
Note: 10 per cent of bank applications were pending at time of survey  
 
 
